

# Dynamic Encryption

Key take away:

Communication infrastructures cannot be assumed secure

→ **Apply security on application level.**

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# Dencrypt A/S

Advanced encryption solutions.

End-to-end encryption across insecure networks.

Dynamic Encryption Principle.


Secure mobile voice calls & messaging

- Common Criteria certified.
- Accredited for classified information.

Dynamic encryption for OEM integration.

Key references:

Danish Defence, NATO.



# Dynamic Encryption principle

Novel technology:

Change cryptosystem for each new data transmission.

Proven minimum security.

Today >95% of all data is encrypted using the same standard (Advanced Encryption Standard, AES).

Why:


Extend crypto life time

Moving target defence

Prevent crypt analysis attacks


Enhanced protection

## DYNAMIC ENCRYPTION (patent pending)



Dynamic Encryption  
Mutating algorithm,  
changing keys


Eg. AES,  
Changing Keys



Invented by:  
Prof. in Cryptology  
Lars Ramkilde Knudsen.  
Technical Univ. of Denmark

## Problem: Mobile infrastructures can not be assumed secure

- Today's mobile systems are a result of an evaluation.
- Contain legacy components and protocols
  - Not designed with today's security implications in mind.
  - Not designed to provide access for a plethora of 3rd party content providers.
- Attackers force system to use the weak protocols.
- Weaknesses are difficult to mitigate.



# Attacks: Signalling System 7 / Diameter

SS7 / Diameter:


Signalling protocol between mobile network core element.

Un-authorized access to core network elements.

- Purchased from 3rd parties
- Misconfigured network elements

Wide range of attacks:

- Location tracking
- Intercept
- Denial of Service
- Spam
- Fraud



60 minutes: Hacking your phone  
April 2016



## Attacks: Signalling System 7 / Diameter

ENISA:

European Union Agency for Network and Information Security

Risk assessment:

*"...medium to high level of risk in this area."*

Mitigative actions are being implemented by operators, but:

*"..., but these measures assure only a basic protection level"*

*"More effort needs to be made so an optimal protection level is achieved."*

Future perspectives for 5G:

*"..., there is a certain risk of repeating history."*



Communication infrastructures cannot be assumed secure  
→ Apply security on application level.

