

# Cybersecurity Best Practices

Philippe WOLF

**S7: Workshop Cyber and Supply Chain**



# Theory of marginal gains

- ▶ Olympics cycling: Marginal gains underpin Team GB dominance



- ▶ Does it work in cybersecurity?



# Successive small corrections

- ▶ Marginal gains
  - More training programs
  - New security filters rules
  - Better definition of passwords
  - One more antimalware
- ▶ **It is not sufficient in cyberdefence** against a determined and prepared opponent
  - 50% better protection does not reduce the risk by half (weakest links, domino and butterfly effects)



# Radical changes are needed

- ▶ Optimization of
  - employee behaviour
  - business and technology processes
- ▶ Best practices in a global approach
  - Compliance levels must exceed a few percent of existing standards
  - Efficiency needs control
    - Must cover the entire supply chain
- ▶ What framework to Use?
  - 3 examples (1US, 2 FR)



# NIST Cybersecurity Framework

- ▶ Cybersecurity — Executive Order 13636 — 2013
  - Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity
    - (1) information sharing
    - (2) privacy
    - (3) the adoption of cybersecurity practices (NIST with private sector)
      - 22 categories, 98 subcategories

Identify

Protect

Detect


Respond

Recover




# French Public Cybersecurity Framework

- ▶ Circulaire Prime Minister — August 2014
  - Applicable to all public entities
    - 10 Principles
    - 13 ISO 27xxx Domains
    - 34 Objectives and 183 Rules



# French Framework for Critical Infrastructures

- ▶ Written in Law
  - Applicable to all designated Vital Operators of Critical Infrastructures
    - 20 Domains
    - 71 Rules



# Matching of Frameworks

- ▶ They are compatible!
- ▶ They cover the necessary changes in a global approach
- ▶ The completeness seems fulfilled

Protective Technology (PR.PT): Technical security solutions are managed to ensure the security and resilience of systems and assets, consistent with related policies, procedures, and agreements.	PR.PT-3: Access to systems and assets is controlled, incorporating the principle of least functionality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- COBIT 5 DSS05.02</li> <li>- ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2,</li> <li>- ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 1.1, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7</li> <li>- ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.9.1.2</li> <li>- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-3, CM-7</li> </ul>	INT-REX-HS PHY-TELECOM PHY-CI-CTRLACC PHY-CI-TRACES	13.1.
	PR.PT-4: Communications and control networks are protected	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CCS CSC 7</li> <li>- COBIT 5 DSS05.02, APO13.01</li> <li>- ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 7.1, SR 7.6</li> <li>- ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1</li> <li>- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-4, AC-17, AC-18, CP-8, SC-7</li> </ul>	PHY-TELECOM	16.3.
Anomalies and Events (DE.AE): Anomalous activity is detected in a timely manner and the potential impact of events is understood.	DE.AE-1: A baseline of network operations and expected data flows for users and systems is established and managed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- COBIT 5 DSS03.01</li> <li>- ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.4.3.3</li> <li>- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-4, CA-3, CM-2, SI-4</li> </ul>	PHY-SI-SUR RES-ENTSOR	8.1.
	DE.AE-2: Detected events are analyzed to understand attack targets and methods	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8</li> <li>- ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 3.9, SR 6.1, SR 6.2</li> <li>- ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.1, A.16.1.4</li> <li>- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-6, CA-7, IR-4, SI-4</li> </ul>	EXP-GES-ANTIVIR EXP-JOUR-SUR	7.2.
	DE.AE-3: Event data are aggregated and correlated from multiple sources and sensors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 6.1</li> <li>- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-6, CA-7, IR-4, IR-5, IR-8, SI-4</li> </ul>	EXP-POL-JOUR	6.1.
	DE.AE-4: Impact of events is determined	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- COBIT 5 APO12.06</li> <li>- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, IR-4, RA-3, SI-4</li> </ul>	EXP-OBSOLET DEV-LOG-ADHER TI-INC-REM	4.4.
	DE.AE-5: Incident alert thresholds are established	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- COBIT 5 APO12.06</li> <li>- ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.10</li> <li>- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 IR-4, IR-5, IR-8</li> <li>- CCS CSC 14.16</li> </ul>	TI-QUAL-TRAIT	9.1.






# And now concerning the supply chain...

A lot has to be done to make these frameworks applicable through the entire supply chain

- ▶ Contracts
- ▶ Efficiency (audits, control)
- ▶ Liability
- ▶ Sanctions
- ▶ Education





# Questions?

[philippe.wolf@irt-systemx.fr](mailto:philippe.wolf@irt-systemx.fr)

